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Abstract
Community Protection Notices (CPNs) are civil preventive orders used in England and
Wales to prevent and/or require specific behaviour by an individual or organisation,
where existing conduct has a ‘detrimental impact on the quality of life of those in the
locality’. Breach of the notice results in a £100 fine under a Fixed Penalty Notice or a
possible criminal conviction. To date, CPNs have tackled an array of perceived anti-
social behaviours, ranging from rough sleeping to overgrown gardens. Using Ashworth
and Zedner’s preventive justice as an analytical framework, our research qualitatively
explores recipients’ experiences of this new tool for the first time. The findings high-
light how the operationalisation of CPNs extends the coercive power of the state, with
a range of negative consequences relating to the concepts of disproportionality, due
process and accountability. We also offer three empirically-grounded recommendations
for reforming CPN practices.
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A Community Protection Notice (CPN) is a civil behavioural notice that imposes
requirements on an individual aged over 16, or an organisation, to undertake or cease
specific actions or behaviours. According to Part 4 of the Anti-Social Behaviour,
Crime and Policing Act (2014), any behaviour can be sanctioned by a CPN if ‘the
conduct of the individual or body is having a detrimental effect, of a persistent or
continuing nature, on the quality of life of those in the locality, and the conduct is
unreasonable’ (Section 43 (1)). The main differences between a CPN and previous
anti-social behaviour (ASB) powers are that the grounds for a CPN are vaguer and
more subjective than the legal ASB definition, with a significantly lower standard of
proof and can be issued without having to go to court. The limited information cur-
rently available about CPNs highlights an increasing, but widely divergent use. An
investigation byMills and Ford (2018) suggests demographic profiles of recipients are
infrequently recorded by local councils and police services, offering little oversight of
the discretionary use of this power. We also know from our own research that the
Home Office does not monitor the use of any of the powers introduced through the
Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, so there is no accountability or top-
down monitoring taking place (Heap and Dickinson, 2018).
To date, no empirical research has been conducted to examine how CPNs are
being experienced by recipients or used by practitioners. This paper begins to
address this gap in understanding by reporting the first, and to date only, research
into the experiences of CPN recipients. The aim was to investigate why, and most
importantly how, individuals come to receive a CPN. In particular, we were keen
to understand recipients’ perceptions of the behaviours sanctioned and their con-
text, recipients’ knowledge and experience of the issuing process and to assess if,
and in what ways, CPNs are being resisted or challenged.
Community Protection Notices
In England and Wales, ASB is legally defined as ‘conduct that has caused, or is
likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person’ (Anti-Social
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, Section 2 (1a)). The Crime Survey for
England and Wales indicates that ASB is a pervasive problem, with 39.6% of
citizens experiencing or witnessing ASB and police recording 1.5 million ASB
incidents in 2019 (Office for National Statistics, 2020, 2019). Powers to tackle
ASB were first introduced by the New Labour government through the Crime
and Disorder Act (1998) as a means of addressing perceived inefficiencies with
the criminal justice system (Burney, 2005). This was followed by a tranche of
legislative measures including the Police Reform Act (2002) and Anti-Social
Behaviour Act (2003), which were designed to provide a holistic, community-
based approach to nuisance behaviour. In 2014, the Home Office introduced the
Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act with a view to enhancing responses
to ASB victimisation by ‘streamlining’ existing powers. A key element of the new
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legislation was the introduction of the CPN, which replaced previous environmen-
tal sanctions including Litter Abatement Notices, Litter Clearing Notices, Street
Litter Clearing Notices, and Defacement Removal Notices. The rationale for cre-
ating the CPN was to facilitate enforcement action against individuals who cause
‘ongoing problems or nuisances which are having a detrimental effect on the
community’s quality of life’ (Home Office, 2019: 39). Traditionally, these behav-
iours were dealt with solely by local councils, but the power to issue CPNs was
extended to any authorised person including the police, local council and registered
social landlords to acknowledge their roles in tackling ASB.
Procedurally, prior to being issued, the individual/organisation must receive a
written Community Protection Warning (CPW), that outlines the nature of the
problem, requests the behaviour to stop and details the consequences of inaction.
The CPW should specify the timeframe within which the behaviour is expected to
change, giving an indication of when a CPN might be issued. How the warning is
discharged and the time given to resolve the problem is left to the discretion of each
authorising body. Breaching a CPN is a criminal offence punishable by a £100 fixed
penalty notice, or a fine of up to £2500 on conviction (£20,000 for organisations).
Punishment for a breach can also include paying for remedial work, forfeiture, or
seizure of items. The prosecuting authority can impose a remedial or forfeiture
order; non-compliance constitutes contempt of court and could result in a custodial
sentence of up to five years. Recipients can appeal a CPN within 21days of issue on
a range of grounds. For example: if they assert that the behaviour did not take place,
the behaviour was not unreasonable, or that any of the requirements are unreason-
able. However, unlike previous ASB sanctions there is no provision in the ASB,
Crime and Policing Act (2014) for a CPN to be varied or discharged, although case
law indicates that authorising bodies should have a review and adjudication system
for this process (Stannard v CPS [2019] EWHC 84 (Admin)). Consequently, if the
opportunity to appeal is not taken at the outset, the CPN could stand indefinitely.
Furthermore, CPNs do not feature in Schedule 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act (2012) and thus the Legal Aid Agency does not grant
funding to appeal a CPN. There is no clear legal basis to appeal or challenge a CPW.
The research presented here uses qualitative data to explore participants’ lived
experience of the CPW/CPN process. The concept of preventive justice as defined
by Ashworth and Zedner (2014) will be used as a theoretical lens through which to
explore CPWs/CPNs in relation to concepts of proportionality, due process, and
accountability. Through understanding recipients’ experiences, the implications for
policy reform will be considered. This feeds into three empirically-grounded rec-
ommendations we offer for adjusting front-line practice to enhance the legitimacy
of the CPW/CPN process.
Anti-social behaviour and preventive justice
Ashworth and Zedner (2014: 1) conceptualised the term preventive justice to assess
‘the principles and values that should guide and limit the state’s use of preventive
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techniques that involve coercion’. The tensions raised within ‘preventive justice’
emerges from the state’s power to utilise tools intended to protect communities
from potential harms, whilst also respecting the autonomy of those individuals
who may be subject to such tools. Tipping the balance in favour of prevention over
protecting individual rights, this contemporary ‘preventive turn’ raises challenges
to the legitimacy and the justification of the justice system (Carvalho, 2017).
This issue is even more pertinent for ASB where the behaviours to be limited by
preventive measures are themselves subjective and contingent upon the perceptions
of others (Millie, 2008).
Ashworth and Zedner establish a taxonomy of criminal offence categories
whose rationale are primarily preventive in that they ‘criminalize acts falling
short of causing the actual harm’ (p.95). These include for example crimes of
membership to a proscribed organisation and crimes of abstract endangerment
where activities are criminalised if they create an unacceptable risk of harm,
even if that harm never occurs, such as speeding. Ashworth and Zedner recognize
the state’s duty to prevent a level of harm to citizens, but reason that if risks are to
be criminalised, rather than regulated, then there should be some restraining prin-
ciples that ought to apply. They also highlight an additional category in the tax-
onomy which includes the offences of ‘doing anything that the person has been
prohibited from doing by a civil preventive order’ (p.102). Here they use the Anti-
Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) as an example. Considered as a ‘punitive zeitgeist
for the period’ (Brown, 2019: 2), ASBOs were a civil order handed down by the
Magistrates’ Court to a person over the age of 10 and could contain an unlimited
number of conditions to prevent ASB. Breaching the order was a criminal offence,
which could attract a custodial sentence of up to five years. Between 1999 and
2013, 24,427 ASBOs were issued by the courts (Home Office, 2016), a figure
already surpassed by CPWs and CPNs in a significantly shorter period of time
(Manifesto Club, 2016, 2017, 2019). ASBOs faced considerable academic scrutiny
and extensive criticism, with empirical inquiry exploring a range of issues includ-
ing: breaches of human rights related to the civil standard of proof (Ashworth
et al., 1998; Pearson, 2006), disproportionate enforcement action against young
people (Squires and Stephen, 2005), and inappropriate conditions (Fletcher, 2005).
That said, Matthews et al. (2007) examined the use and impact of ASBOs, finding
them effective at providing some respite to victims, with perpetrators reporting a
reduction in their offending behaviour.
Ashworth and Zedner (2014) raised a series of objections against the use of the
ASBO. Fundamentally they highlighted the breadth of the concepts of harassment,
alarm or distress. They also noted high levels of court discretion and scope for
the prohibitions imposed to be disproportionate to the behaviour in question.
The ASBO is the most similar predecessor to the CPN, which is part of a new
generation of preventive orders introduced to tackle ASB by the Anti-Social
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014). The CPN is considered in this article
as a form of preventive justice in line with Ashworth and Zedner’s taxonomy of
civil offences. However, we argue that the conditions that are subject to objection
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in relation to the ASBO are extended further with the CPN and thus require
greater consideration of the necessary restraining principles. Recipients’ experien-
ces of CPNs highlight the tensions that this tool creates, particularly around pro-
portionality of use, due process and the ability to hold this power to account.
The concept of proportionality as a constraint on criminal punishment is well
established (Steiker, 2013). Preventive orders, however, are intended to
shape future behaviour, rather than account for past conduct (Crawford, 2009).
The imposition of a preventive order on an individual is demonstrative of that
individual’s ‘failure to reassure’ others that they are safe from future harm
(Ramsay, 2012). In this context, preventive proportionality must then ‘focus on
the degree of harm sought to be averted and the likelihood that the harm would
occur in the absence of prevention’ (Steiker, 2013: 196). The discretionary nature
of CPNs allows officers to insert requirements that prohibit the recipient from
engaging in behaviour likely to cause any harassment, alarm or distress to the
community. Therefore, the order may disproportionately punish behaviour
beyond the scope of the initial act. Furthermore, as CPNs can be open-ended in
timescale, their design affords the opportunity for excessively lengthy punishment
to occur beyond the risk of harm.
Preventive orders have been criticised for their disregard of due process as a
result of their ‘two-step’ approach; where a civil order becomes criminalised upon
breach. For Crawford (2009: 818) the blurring of civil and criminal processes seen
within ASB powers is evidence of ‘evading higher standards of proof and eviden-
tiary burdens associated with the criminal justice process’. Whereas the subjective
nature of the powers ‘necessitates rigour and standardisation’ in their application
(Donoghue, 2010: 151). Under the civil standard of proof, the legal tests for issuing
a CPN set out in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) are:
having a detrimental effect on the community’s quality of life, being of a persistent
or continuing nature, and being unreasonable. However, as CPNs are not issued
by a court they bypass the usual procedural safeguards that a suspect would
expect. This out of court process is problematic when considering the perceived
legitimacy of CPNs, given the evidence that suggests ‘people’s general commitment
to obeying the law is heightened when they experience fair procedures in legal
settings’ (Tyler, 2007: 28). The growing literature on procedural justice demon-
strates that the way in which interventions are delivered may actually have a
greater impact on compliance behaviour than the interventions themselves
(Crawford et al., 2017). The range of actors that can exercise their discretion
and subjective interpretation of the legal tests when deciding whether to issue a
CPN means that there could be a wide variation in the manner in which these
coercive powers could be deployed. Consequently, the opportunity for procedures
to be seen as unjust increases.
Preventive orders focus on restraining possible conduct in order to avoid future
harms to the wider community. This ‘what if’ logic circumvents the principle of the
presumption of innocence and instead works on the ‘likelihood’ of future guilt
(Crawford, 2009). As Ramsay (2009) has argued, an individual’s ‘failure to
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reassure’ is ‘a legal burden akin to a presumption of guilt. It reverses the onus of
proof in respect not of accusations about the past, but of fears about the future’
(Ramsay, 2009: 120). The first stage in the process of a CPN is a CPW that
stipulates which behaviours must or must not continue. If a recipient abides by
the stipulations, then no further action takes place. They are comparable to the
regulatory tools described by Crawford (2009: 816) whereby individuals are offered
a ‘choice’ to ‘comply or else’. A breach of a CPW can lead to a CPN. However,
there is no formal process for appealing a CPW and thus no prescribed way for
having it removed, regardless of the perception of the recipient around suggested
wrongdoing, guilt or innocence. The CPW operates as a ‘cordon sanitaire’ (empha-
sis in original), a buffer zone placed around an individual to constrain their activ-
ities and movements in order to avoid harm to others (Ashworth and Zedner,
2014: 91). Recipients of a full CPN can appeal within 21 days of issue; however
as mentioned previously, these appeals are not supported by legal aid and thus
reduce equality of access. For Ashworth and Zedner (2014: 86), civil preventive
orders such as ASBOs allow courts the authority to create individual prohibitions
or ‘a personal criminal law’ which ‘fails - certainly in practice - to afford the
defendant sufficient opportunity to contest the restrictions on liberty that the
court intends to impose’ (p.87). In the context of the CPN, this delegation of
power extends beyond courts to those practitioners issuing orders on the frontline.
The challenges raised above in relation to CPNs highlight the requirement to
explore and understand how these tools are being used in practice and the impact
that they are having on the recipients. This article offers a novel contribution to the
field by documenting the first academic investigation into recipients’ experiences
using the qualitative method of in-depth interviews.
Methodology
The qualitative research strategy was employed to assess how recipients experi-
enced the CPW/CPN issuing process and beyond. Data were collected through
fifteen semi-structured telephone interviews with CPW/CPN recipients, with con-
versations lasting approximately one hour. Telephone interviews were favoured
because they offered the flexibility to recruit participants from across England in a
cost-efficient manner. Research has shown that telephone interviews can encour-
age the disclosure of information to the interviewer and do not compromise data
quality (Novick, 2008). In addition, seven participants provided copies of the
CPW/CPN documents they were issued, which provided an insight into the
types of requirements set in relation to the nature of the complaint(s).
Participants were recruited using two variations of non-probability sampling.
First, purposive sampling was used through the research team’s collaboration
with Manifesto Club, an organisation that challenges the hyper-regulation of
public spaces, who contacted known recipients on our behalf to invite them to
participate. Second, convenience sampling was utilised by searching social media
for CPW/CPN recipients, as well as contacting national and local newspapers that
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had published stories about these cases. The similar experiences across the sample
were sufficient to generate a range of cross-cutting themes to address the research
questions and provide conceptual density (Nelson, 2016). A limitation of this
work is that it only details the experiences of a relatively small number of recipients
and not those of issuing officers. Nevertheless, the aim of this study is to present
the perspectives of those subject to CPWs/CPNs and to highlight some of the
concerns arising from their reported experiences, which has been used to
inform research into practitioners’ issuing processes that is currently being under-
taken by the authors.
Of the sample, 9 were male and 6 female. The mean average age was 53.6 years,
with an age range between 24 and 70 years. All participants were based in England,
across a variety of regions; 4 from the East Midlands, 4 from the South East, 3
from the South West, and 1 from London. The sample was predominantly White
(14), with the remainder of Mixed ethnicity (1). Two participants did not provide
age, ethnicity or location information. In relation to the CPWs/CPNs, 8 partici-
pants had received a CPW and 7 a CPW and CPN, of that 7, one person had
received a CPW followed by a CPN, then two separate CPWs for different issues.
Nine participants were issued their notices by local councils and 6 by the police.
A total of 6 CPWS/CPNs were eventually either rescinded or successfully
appealed. A summary of the cases, which includes details about the ASB, issuing
body and whether the notice was appealed can be found in Table 1.
The interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed using Braun and
Clarke’s (2006) six-phase process which entails: familiarising yourself with the
data; generating initial codes; searching for themes; reviewing themes; defining
and naming themes; and producing the report. This approach provided a theoret-
ically flexible means of systematically searching ‘across’ the dataset to locate repeat-
ed patterns, suitable for an unexplored phenomenon. Ethical approval was granted
by the authors’ institution and adheres to the British Society of Criminology
Statement of Ethics (2015). Participants’ privacy, anonymity and confidentiality
were upheld, and the names presented in this paper are pseudonyms.
Findings
Proportionality: Cases and requirements
Analysis of the original CPW/CPN documents highlights the issue of proportion-
ality. The CPWs and CPNs in our sample had been employed to sanction a wide
range of behaviours (see Table 1). This variety demonstrates how Home Office
guidance (2019: 38), which states that the purpose of a CPN is to address ‘anti-
social behaviour which spoils the community’s quality of life’, has been embraced
flexibly by practitioners and moves significantly beyond the environmental meas-
ures CPNs were designed to replace. In addition, the requirements stipulated in the
CPW/CPN documents analysed for this study were either ‘ongoing’ or did not
specify an end date for the notice. This open-ended requirement raises the question
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of duration which, when related to preventive orders, implies the continued dan-
gerousness or riskiness of the individual which cannot be overcome even where
immediate changes are made (Steiker, 2013).
Disproportionality could also be seen in the wide range of prohibitions on
participants’ behaviours. Ashworth and Zedner (2014) highlight that the
requirements in preventive orders are likely to not only target the direct behaviour
in question, but also occurrences that may lead to this behaviour. They raise two
objections to this; firstly it goes beyond the minimum requirements necessary to
impose on an individual, and secondly it fails to treat the individual as a respon-
sible agent who can decide for themselves how to behave (p.86). It was evident
from the CPW/CPNs analysed that many included requirements that went
beyond the type of ASB that resulted in their CPW/CPN being issued. For exam-
ple, five CPW/CPNs contained a generic condition that requires them to ‘not act in
any manner or engage in any activity which causes or is likely to cause
annoyance, nuisance, alarm, harassment and/or distress to any person not of
your household within [an area]’. Subsequently, a recipient issued with a CPW/
CPN for walking dogs off a lead, could be issued with a fixed penalty notice for an
entirely unrelated incident; based on the low behavioural threshold of nuisance and
annoyance under the civil burden of proof. This type of catch-all requirement is
not only disproportionate and incongruent to the initial behaviour; it also reflects
how issuing officers have the power to define recipients as a wider risk to the
community.
Alongside the disproportionality found within the actual wording of the
CPW/CPN was the disproportionality and injustice felt amongst the participants
in their accounts of the issuing process. These narratives, of course, represent
only the perspectives of the recipients. However, their experiences and perceived
legitimacy of the process have direct implications for compliance with the notice
requirements and its attempts to mediate respective quality of life issues
(Crawford et al., 2017). Negative feelings towards ASB sanctions are not new.
Matthews et al. (2007) reported 40% of their sample of ASBO recipients felt
their order was unfair, inappropriate or disproportionate. Despite this, some
respondents also acknowledged that their behaviour was problematic and
improved as a result of the order. In this study, participants generally did not
acknowledge their behaviour as problematic as a consequence of the CPN.
However, many stated that they complied with the requirements in the first
instance, mostly due to a threat of sanctions. This raises important questions
around the long-term impact of these tools on behavioural change and on
addressing community conflict.
For most participants in this study, their case was also much more complex than
the CPW/CPN requirements suggested. To illustrate, in 8 out of 15 cases, the
requirements related to specific behaviours such as: noise nuisance or feeding
birds. However, through the interview process it became clear that the recipient
was in a long-standing neighbour dispute with the complainant and thus they felt
Heap et al. 9
they were being individually punished for a wider-ranging dispute, where the other
actor(s) involved were perceived as not facing any sanctions. Agnes said:
They’re asking me . . . to stop feeding all birds in the vicinity of my property, the birds
are there, the birds land on the roof whether I feed them or not. Carol . . . she feeds
birds. Two houses away from her and another house next to them, I know they feed
birds. . . . It’s an unrealistic and stupid request, so therefore it’s for eternity that I get
criminalised and Carol on the other side is fine. (Agnes)
The above statement also echoes the findings of Ashworth and Zedner (2014) that
civil orders like ASBOs are a ‘personal criminal law’ in which prohibited behaviours
are tailored to the individual. This means that a breach of these requirements and
any subsequent punishment affects only that individual and does not fall equally
across the citizenry (Ramsay, 2012), thus preventing behaviours only for some.
Due process: Procedure and communication
Participants articulated a range of experiences about the CPW/CPN issuing pro-
cess. Home Office guidance (2019) makes it clear that informal interventions must
be fully exhausted before formal sanctions are pursued. However, 12 out of 15
participants stated that they received no informal communication before being
issued with their CPW. Whilst this cannot be corroborated, the participants’ per-
spective that they had not received any communication sits against a backdrop of
renewed policy emphasis on the incremental approach towards conduct regulation,
which was re-imagined by the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014). When informal
interventions were described, such as attempts at mediation between both parties,
participants stated there was no indication given about the potential for formal
proceedings and no explanation given about the nature of CPNs, which meant the
CPW came as a surprise to the recipients. For example:
The neighbour had spoken to my wife on one occasion and the fact that the Police
Community Support Officer had spoken to my wife in the front garden one Saturday.
You know when we got the warning letter it was like a big shock. (Ian)
With 9 out of 15 participants receiving their letter through the post, most recipients
did not have the chance for any dialogue about the behaviour with the issuer.
Home Office guidance (2019) affords officers the opportunity to post the notices as
a means of maintaining their own safety. However, utilising this method appeared
to have a detrimental effect on the recipients because they had no opportunity to
express their perspective that the notice was incorrectly issued. This practice intro-
duced elements of confusion and distress into the process, which Olivia explains:
I think that if they are going to issue something through your letterbox which is along
the lines of a warning or a notice and you’re not home, so they haven’t spoken to you,
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I think that maybe they should do it in a way where initially it’s a conversation. So,
for example, if they sent the letter through saying there’s this issue, can you speak to
this person about it and then you speak to that person and they explain their side and
you explain your side and see if an agreement can be reached. . . (Olivia)
Participants reported that not enough time was allocated to address the require-
ments in their warning letters. In our sample, the timescales ranged from ‘imme-
diately’ to a maximum period of 14 days. These expectations were particularly
problematic when financial and/or emotional investment was necessary to address
the situation, for example replacing broken fencing or the removal of a homeless
individual’s belongings from a private service road. Monica details her experience:
When I saw it I thought oh my god, it says unless you take – I mean she issued it 3rd
April and she gave until 17th April to sort it all out to make sure that your poultry are
confined to your land at all times so that’s two weeks to sort it out, not a lot of people
can sort it out in two so what if they get out on 18th? Then you’re automatically going
to be issuing me with a fixed penalty notice. You get 30 days with a parking notice so
why should they be able to put two weeks for you to remedy it? That’s a ridiculously
short timescale. (Monica)
The practice of issuing notices by post that contain arbitrary timescales raises a
range of concerns. First it highlights the extent of officer discretion, which allows
unfeasible timescales to be set. Resultantly, the time allocated to address the
behaviour may not necessarily be proportionate to the extent of potential harm
caused during the time period, thus creating an over-coercive demand. Second, the
lack of time given in comparison to other offences punished by fixed penalty
notices diminishes the perceived legitimacy of CPNs, which could curtail compli-
ance. Third, the issuing of these notices at a distance removes the opportunity for
recipients to seek clarification on the complex mechanics of their CPW/CPN,
which if they need to, begins to erode the time allocated to make the changes
required by the notice.
Communication difficulties were raised by 10 out of 15 participants. The biggest
problem was contacting the issuing authority to discuss the contents of the CPW/
CPN. Participants described phone calls, emails and letters not being replied to for
a matter of weeks, if at all, and the feeling of being pushed from person to person
without satisfactory resolution. Natasha’s experience epitomises that of the
sample:
Because I had the CPN the police weren’t interested, so as soon as you’ve been given a
CPN you’re tarred with this ‘you’re a pain in the arse’ brush . . . I mean the police
basically told me that if I have any problems I need to speak to the council. They
weren’t interested. I was tarred with a brush. Then I phoned the council who have
issued me a CPN that are on the other people’s side in the first place. It was really bad.
(Natasha)
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One participant reported that the details provided on the CPW were incorrect,
which meant the issuing officer could not be contacted and led to many phone calls
to a range of authorities. The poor experiences of communicating with the author-
ities enhanced participants’ feelings that the process was unfair and haphazard.
This reflects Bradford et al.’s (2009) research, which found that negative police
contact was associated with negative opinions about effectiveness and fairness.
Accountability: Evidence, appeal and resistance
One significant area of concern amongst participants who had received a CPW/
CPN was the low issuing evidence threshold on which they were administered.
Many recipients were unaware of the evidence presented against them. This lack of
transparency heightened feelings of injustice and disparity within the authorising
procedure and opened up scope for challenging the legitimacy of the power:
No, they never, ever presented me with any evidence whatsoever. He just says in his
original warning letter ‘following an investigation of complaints received, I have now
set aside that your conduct is unreasonable’ and you see when I looked up this law on
Section 43, basically it gives local authorities the right to issue these warnings and
notices without actually having any real evidence where they base all their so-called
evidence on hearsay from neighbours. . . (Agnes)
The inability to scrutinise and verify the evidence prevented the recipients from
countering the argument. This lack of open dialogue or transparency generated
frustration and led to feelings of an . . .”administrative abuse of process” (John).
Participants highlighted a lack of knowledge that complaints were ongoing after
the CPW, leaving them in breach of their stated conditions:
Then three months later I received a full CPN, basically re-stating what it says within
the warning and nothing else. . .. I couldn’t see any reason why, you know.
They hadn’t notified us of any further complaints, they hadn’t notified us of anything,
so I basically said, well you know, I don’t see why I should be issued with a
Community Protection Notice without proper support and proper evidence and with-
out the benefit of a conversation to say this is happening or we’ve received further
complaints. (Stuart)
The issue of evidence further added to questions of legitimacy in cases where the
complaint came solely from an authorised person based on their own assessment of
a situation. Whilst this is a designated practice within the legislation, it opens up
questions of subjectivity, further adding to the already assailable notions of what
constitutes ASB. As Hough (2012) argues, people are more likely to accept out-
comes that do not benefit themselves if they consider officials to be using legitimate
authority. Here participants queried the judgement of the official producing the
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evidence for which the warnings were administered and the incapacity for it to be
independently challenged:
Well, basically this guy’s judgements. The officer made the judgement that my garden
was out of control and so it’s his own judgement and for me that wasn’t good enough
because there are some people who would mow their lawn every single day and I’m
afraid I’m not one of those people. (Steve)
Participants expressed frustration at being unable to appeal a CPW; experiencing it
as confirmation of offending behaviour that they themselves denied committing,
entirely removing the presumption or opportunity to prove innocence (Crawford,
2009). The inability to challenge the warning effectively constrained individuals
and left them little recourse to justice:
Because the threshold of providing nuisance isn’t properly defined and because you’re
effectively treated guilty until you can prove yourself innocent or in this case because
we got the warning letter there’s nothing we can do to challenge it. (Ian)
As Ashworth and Zedner (2014) have argued, the delegation of power to create
individualised law outside the legislature leaves defendants little scope to challenge
it. For some participants this left them feeling ‘trapped’ by the cordon sanitaire
imposed upon them, forcing compliance and demonstrating the effect of the CPW
as a regulatory tool for coercing people’s future behaviour (Crawford et al., 2017):
. . . so it kind of felt like you have to comply with it. Do you know what I mean? It’s
like something has come through your door, you have to comply with it and you don’t
really have an option. (Olivia)
In order to have a voice in the proceedings some participants engaged in acts of
resistance. Resistance to authority can be identified when a person refuses to cooperate
as a way of expressing “. . .their right to challenge policies and laws, and/or authority
treatment, they see as unfair or unreasonable” (Cherney and Murphy, 2011: 232). This
was seen when participants refused to sign the CPWwhen it was delivered to their door
as a symbol of their right to challenge, as Trudy said, “He [police] said, ‘are you going
to accept this?’ I said no, you know, because he wanted me to sign it”. Signing was seen
as a form of acceptance that the behaviour in question was wrong. In refusing, the
CPW was positioned as an order rather than an agreement between the authorising
body and the recipient. Participants described informal methods of challenging the
warning or notice that they had been given, with some success in having them
rescinded. This highlights the differential nature of local practices which is enabled
through the lack of top-down monitoring (Heap and Dickinson, 2018):
I sent some emails to [Force name] Police and to a long list of officers including the
chief constable and their head of legal services department and made a couple more
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phone calls I believe and after about a month I got a hand delivered letter saying that
it had been rescinded. I know that’s not the prescribed route to take, it’s to go to court
isn’t it and challenge it. (Liam)
Some participants formally resisted the sanctions by using the only legitimately
prescribed route; an appeal. One participant’s proposed solution to the CPW
was to “get a CPN issued against me so I can then challenge it in a court”
(John). For those participants who received a CPN and appealed, many described
the legal process as requiring significant emotional, mental and physical labour on
their part:
It’s just incredible. The experience of trying to fight this by myself. I mean I’ve got two
Masters degrees. . . I’ve had to do as much for this appeal which I’ve won as I did for
one or two of those dissertations. That hard work is exhausting, it’s made me ill and
it’s almost destroyed my life. I don’t know if that’s enough but I’m left thinking what
has my doctor said to me right from the start, I’m left thinking what about all
these people who -? This is so unjust, and people can’t defend themselves. That’s
what I think. (Trudy)
Highlighted in the above experience was a reflective account of the economic and
social capital needed to be able to proceed through a full court appeal, inevitably
resulting in the exclusion of some from accessing spaces of justice:
I just felt it was really sad that I’m too poor to be innocent; do you know what
I mean? No one told me in this process when they issued you with a CPN, and it
does say you can appeal, it doesn’t mention anywhere that if you appeal it’s going to
cost a lot of money. My lawyer, he didn’t actually – He’d never done a CPN because
no one really appeals them. They’re only for 12 months and you just wait it out and I
was like, yeah, but to me it just didn’t feel right. It didn’t feel right at all. It felt unjust
that someone had given me a penalty which I didn’t deserve. (Bernard)
If a recipient is unable to appeal at the CPW or CPN stage, then there is a lack of
accountability for the decisions made on the part of the authorising authority.
As Ashworth and Zedner (2014) have argued, coercive preventive measures
should be subject to restraining principles and accountability is key to turning
those principles to practice.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper reports on the first qualitative inquiry into Community Protection
Notices, shedding light on how this new power is being implemented and conse-
quently experienced as a coercive tool. The findings situate the testimonies of our
participants within a preventive justice analytical framework that highlights a range
of tensions surrounding the development and execution of CPWs and CPNs as
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preventive techniques. Our analysis echoes the concerns raised about their closest
predecessor the ASBO by Ashworth and Zedner (2014) in relation to disproportion-
ality, due process and accountability. It also demonstrates that CPWs and CPNs
have further eroded recipients’ procedural rights and extended the coercive power of
the state, thus prioritising the risk of future harms posed to the community.
Our research shows that CPNs appear to be operating at the edges of their
flexibility, evidenced by the vast range of behaviours being sanctioned. The great-
est procedural difference between an ASBO and a CPN is that the latter is not
issued by a court, but by an individual. Consequently, the breadth of issuing agents
is much wider than previous powers and it is the power invested in a single officer
that determines the extent of the cordon sanitaire. The magnitude of discretionary
decisions afforded to frontline personnel results in an individual officer’s actions
shaping the issuing process experienced by the recipients, which has the potential
to result in wildly different applications of the power. The lack of transparency
surrounding the implementation process, accompanied by a dearth of procedural
safeguards, diminishes the legitimacy of CPNs in the eyes of recipients; evidenced
by a third of our sample not complying with the requirements stated in their order.
As a result of the perceived unfairness of the implementation process, our partic-
ipants expressed dissatisfaction with their notices due to inconsistencies in com-
munication, the lack of clarity about the order itself, and concerns about the
consequences for breach. This resulted in a clear distinction between the third of
participants that did not comply, and the remainder who felt trapped into com-
pliance; this group expressed their fear of financial hardship if they received a fine,
or negative consequences for their career if they received a criminal conviction. The
issues and uncertainties we uncovered were experienced in combination resulting in
feelings of helplessness and vulnerability due to a lack of evidence with emotions
exacerbated by no prospect of appealing the initial CPW.
The challenge faced by issuing officers is to balance the rights of the community
to be free from the risk of future harms without disproportionately punishing the
recipient based on the degree of ASB they have exhibited. Due to the extent and
impacts of ASB victimisation (see Heap, 2020), a power such as the CPN can have
beneficial impact in protecting individuals and communities experiencing harm.
However, the tool requires reform so that the current design of CPNs and its
ability to be misapplied does not undermine its potential value to victims of
ASB. The complexity and subjectivity of ASB tools and powers is evident from
the number of CPW/CPNs in our sample (6) that were rescinded or successfully
appealed in courts. Further work by the authors is currently ongoing to supple-
ment recipients’ experiences with practitioners’ experiences of issuing CPNs. Our
findings raise pertinent questions for frontline practice. A range of adjustments
could be made to the issuing process to enhance the legitimacy of CPWs and CPNs
and we offer three recommendations:
1. Thorough casework should be undertaken to consider the possibility of victim-
isation being experienced by the intended recipient. The complexity of the cases
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detailed in our research showed that a more nuanced understanding of the
situation could have resulted in a more appropriate, and consequently less
punitive, early intervention being employed; for example, mediation or restor-
ative justice. The CPN process is designed to be swift but should not be
employed simply as a ‘quick fix’.
2. A more effective communication strategy should be created to provide a more
transparent issuing process that meets the needs of both parties. For example,
the issuing officer should communicate with the potential recipient, preferably
verbally and in person, before a CPW is issued. This initial contact should
provide details about: the alleged ASB and supporting evidence, the potential
for escalation should the behaviour continue, and the consequences of non-
compliance with any sanctions. Recipients should also be able to contact the
issuing officer to discuss their case and the authorities should ensure there is
appropriate infrastructure in place to support this.
3. The timescales allocated to recipients to address the ASB in question should be
more flexible to account for the practicalities of making any changes (such as
employing someone to conduct remedial work and the associated costs) and be
proportionate to the risk of harm.
Further to these three suggestions based on our original empirical research, we
also advocate that training practices should be explored due to the extent of dis-
cretionary decisions undertaken by frontline officers to ensure the notices are
proportionate. Greater research into the training provided to all issuing authorities
(police, local councils and registered social landlords) is necessary to understand
the issuing thresholds of ASB to safeguard against unsuitable notices being issued.
We also propose that comments from the Stannard v CPS [2019] EWHC 84
(Admin) judgement are heeded, which were made following the unsuccessful
appeal of a CPN at the High Court on the grounds of it being invalid. Despite
the outcome, the court stated that requirements should be no more than necessary
to address the behaviour in question. Additionally, there should be no generic
requirements that prohibit the recipient from causing any harassment, alarm, dis-
tress, nuisance or annoyance. Furthermore, authorising bodies should have a
review and adjudication system in place to provide the opportunity for CPWs
and CPNs to be discharged. Given that the number of CPWs and CPNs dispensed
has already far outnumbered those of ASBOs, work to improve the procedural
safeguards and associated communications related to the issuing process should be
considered a priority.
Our study demonstrates that recipients of CPWs and CPNs are not responding
to the orders in the manner expected by practitioners. Resultantly, further research
is required to better understand how CPNs are implemented from the perspectives
of both practitioners and victims. Continued scrutiny of this power is necessary to
ensure that recipients are not treated unfairly because of ongoing issues with
disproportionality, due process and accountability. Ultimately, these sanctions
need to be operating effectively in order to reduce the harm caused by ASB.
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